America's Secret War

George Friedman

Saudis

When U.S. forces first deployed in Saudi Arabia in order to face down Iraq, they were confined to bases. The reason was that the Saudis were afraid that public awareness of the American presence on their soil would generate a massive reaction. On one rare occasion when U.S. troops went off base, a small group visited a Saudi coffee shop. There they were taunted by Saudis, who told them that the Saudi government had merely hired the U.S. Army, just as they hired engineers or servants. The U.S. soldiers responded vigorously, and were later brought up on charges.

The incident resulted in a sharp encounter between Norman Schwarzkopf and the Saudi command. Schwarzkopf demanded that the Saudis take steps to stamp out the perception, encouraged by the government, that the Americans were simply hired mercenaries under Saudi control. What Schwarzkopf and the rest of the U.S. government didn't grasp is that the story was spread among the Saudi population because the Saudi government harbored a desperate fear: that the presence of U.S. forces in Arabia would trigger an uprising. In fact it did generate a rising, but not an immediate one. It triggered Al Qaeda.[..]

[After 9/11] The Saudis simply did not want to participate in the American war [against al Qaida] to any extent that would have made a difference. This startled the United States, which believed it had saved the Saudis during Desert Storm. It was the culmination of a policy that had been evolving for a decade. The United States needed a way to pressure the Saudis into doing what the Americans needed—even though it was not in the Saudi interest. The United States pressed, and the Saudis deflected [..]

The central dilemma the U.S. now faced was how to get the Saudis into the war. The problem was that the Saudis did not think the United States was going to win this war. They understood the region and their own country far better than the Americans, and the United States did not terrify the Saudis nearly as much as Al Qaeda did. The Saudis had heard U.S. rhetoric in the past and were not impressed. Somehow the U.S. had to demonstrate just how serious and frightening it could be, and then be in a position to put massive military and political pressure on the Saudis.

This was the origin of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq.[..]

China

Donald Rumsfeld had said, just before September 11, that the United States was going to reorient its entire defense policy to focus on Asia—which meant to counter the growth of Chinese power. This was the last thing China needed.

In that sense, September 11 was a welcome relief for China, since it diverted American attention and relieved pressure on China. At the same time, China had a serious Islamist problem of its own. Xinjiang province was predominantly Muslim, and a significant rebellion was under way there, which included bombings around China. China wanted to weaken the Islamists but didn't want to see Americans dominating its western frontiers or increasing its power dramatically. As much as it welcomed the relief following September 11, it understood that U.S. victory in the war on Al Qaeda would leave China extremely vulnerable to U.S. power...

France

Ever since Charles de Gaulle, France had been deeply concerned about its declining position in the world. France saw the rise of American power, particularly after the end of the Cold War, as a threat to its national interest—in particular, to its critical economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. France had absolutely no desire to see an increase in American power. It had a national strategy of blocking the rise of American power in any way possible....

France saw the U.S. intention to invade Iraq as both a threat and a golden opportunity. The threat was that France would be further marginalized in the region and become even less significant globally. The opportunity was that the threat would allow France to galvanize Europe into changing from an economic unit into a more unified political unit with a foreign policy defined by France. ...

In tandem with the Germans, France turned up the pressure to create a European consensus. With the two major powers united, and public opinion aggressively antiwar, the French plan seemed irresistible. Pressure built toward a unified statement throughout January 2003, as the American buildup surged and the sense of impending war intensified. Oil prices had risen dramatically, and economists were claiming that the war would result in economic calamity. The United States appeared to have played directly into the hands of the French on January 22, when Donald Rumsfeld made a speech in which he referred to France and Germany as “the Old Europe.” What he appeared to be saying was that France and Germany represented moral decay and weakness. It was, in particular, a dig at the French, reminding them of their failure in World War II and before.

Rumsfeld's speech appeared to be a massive blunder, typical of Rumsfeld, in which his intemperate comments would simply further enrage European politicians and public opinion. In fact, it was carefully considered and intended to take advantage of a process that U.S. diplomats and intelligence had been noting carefully, but had been overlooked by the media: the growing concern in Europe about a Franco-German axis, allied with Russia, dominating European foreign policy...

On January 30, 2003, an extraordinary editorial appeared in The Wall Street Journal. In it, eight European countries publicly broke with the Franco-German bloc and endorsed the American position on Iraq. They were: Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. This was a huge chunk of Europe, and soon after, almost all of Eastern Europe had turned against the French. In the end, the only countries siding with France, Germany, and Russia were Belgium, Sweden, Greece, and Belarus. This was not an insignificant bloc—France, Germany, and Russia were a large chunk of Europe—but it was a group of leaders without followers. American diplomacy and geopolitical reality had effectively split the European bloc down the middle.